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Abstract
The goal of the article is to present the context in which we, modern readers and 
scholars, make meaningful use of the words “happiness,” “luck,” and “fortune.” 
This discussion starts by examining Crœsus’s question to Solon, who is the 
happiest man on earth, and then continues by analyzing Solon’s reply that a man 
can only be called happy after his death. Next, it aims to show what is implied 
and meant in Solon’s obscure reply. As the article explores, it turns out that 
Solon is talking about the transient fortune (ευτυχιη) and the permanent fortune 
(ολβος), measured after the number of fortunate moments in one’s lifespan, 
and not about the subjective disposition of being happy, as the modern speaker 
uses this term. At this point, the article offers Aristotle’s reading of Solon and 
his alternative interpretation of Solon’s concept of happiness. According to 
Aristotle, happiness is more a matter of character, of quality rather than quantity. 
The article continues by isolating the term “happiness” from the quantitative 
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factor which still plays a role for Aristotle. In conclusion, the article presents 
a paradox that stems from conceiving happiness as a quantitative matter; that 
is, that not even death can serve as an ultimate final stage after which we could 
conclusively declare someone to have been happy or not. 
Keywords: Aristotle, Solon, Herodotus, happiness, luck, transient fortune, 
permanent fortune
As an undergraduate student I was struck by Solon’s response to the Lydian 
King Crœsus’ question, which asks who is the “happiest man” in the world? 
Solon contends that in order to state that one is blessed, the individual in 
question must already be dead, for as long as one is alive, his fortunate 
condition can change for the worse at any possible moment. Thus Solon 
tells us that until a man has arrived at the hour of his death, we can, at best, 
say that he is fortunate. 
I first encountered Solon’s peculiar reply in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics book 1, where Aristotle painstakingly aims to solve the problem of 
the “blessed dead.” I was a bit uncomfortable with Aristotle’s approach to 
this problem, although I could not identify what exactly made his response 
awkward. I then encountered the whole story in Herodotus’ Histories, which 
Aristotle refers to in the Nicomachean Ethics. My reoccurring uneasiness 
with how to interpret Aristotle’s interpretation of the “blessed dead” led me 
to examine how other scholars treat this text. In researching other responses 
to the conversation between Solon and Crœsus, I came to the conclusion 
that not only are Solon’s response and Aristotle’s argument insufficient 
in assessing the topic of happiness, but the question itself seems to be 
completely devoid of meaning. This lack of signification occurs when we 
translate the term “happiness” into our modern application, namely, as long 
as we take “happiness” as the sum of lucky moments in one’s life rather 
than a subjective disposition.1 In addition to my concerns about the question 
1 David Asheri shows us that “happiness” and “good fortune” both have an innate 
reference to “luck” in any given case. This, however, does not render the meaning of 
happiness as a subjective disposition. Asheri explains: “The terms for human well-
being that recur in the dialogue are four ολβος, ευτυχιη, ευδαιμονιη, μακαριζω, but the 
fundamental distinction is between permanent ‘happiness’ (ολβος) and transient good 
luck (ευτυχιη), see 32,7. In Herodotus, ολβος can also mean ‘wealth’ (30,1), and is not 
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itself, I was disappointed by the way other scholars approached the text. 
Their accumulative way to look at happiness was weak and lacked sufficient 
analysis.2 They treated the text as if “x” number of happy units (days, minutes, 
seconds, etc.) have the capacity to make up the concept of complete bliss 
or happiness. According to this approach to the text, the “fragility of the 
goodness” stems from the swinging balance between these aforementioned 
good and bad units. In direct contrast to these scholarly interpretations of 
the text, I believe that, if we are to render this question to be meaningful in 
a modern context, we must first identify and flesh out the form and structure 
of the question put up by Crœsus before we can point our attention to any 
other aspect of the meaning behind this conversation between the two men. 
By commencing with an examination of the question, we realize that it can 
be only about luck and chance; a meditation on happiness is not the purpose 
of this initial question according to a more thorough examination of what 
specifically the question is asking.3 In this analytical approach, we achieve 
a meaningful distinction between “happiness” and “luck,” but the question 
to the material and objective pleasures of this world. The two terms, ολβος and ευτυχιη, 
are not mutually exclusive: the ‘lucky’ man can become ‘happy’ if he does not incur 
misfortune before his life ends in a glorious (Tellus) or a peaceful death (Cleobis and 
Biton). Both ευτυχιη and ολβος signify the sum of the same series of material goods: 
good health, good children, good looks, physical strength and a good income. The only 
significant distinction is that between a temporary state of well-being and a secure, 
permanent one, immortalized in the memory of future generations.” D. Asheri, A. Lloyd, 
A. Corcella (2007), A Commentary on Herodotus, Books I–IV. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 97–98. 
2 For an example of this textual approach, see R. C. Solomon’s (1976), “Is there 
Happiness after Death?” Philosophy 196: 189–193. The common type of argument that 
states that the value of a series is not simply achieved by going through all of episodes 
in one’s life succeeds only in ultimately degrading itself to an accumulative discussion. 
For a further example, see A. Kenny’s (1992) Aristotle on the Perfect Life. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 23ff. On page 27, he discusses the strange example of the best 
breakfast to illustrate his claims. For a further treatment of this matter, see the discussion 
in N. P. White’s (2006), A Brief History of Happiness. Malden: Blackwell, 75–115. 
3 In his masterful study of the text, Christopher Pelling points out the need for indirect 
language which stems from the uneasiness involved in speaking to a despot with the 
implicit intention of educating him. Solon’s purpose is to instruct Crœsus about his υβρις 
and the dangers caused by it as these factors have the capacity to lead to his destruction. 
This is the lesson that Crœsus passes forward to Cyrus, who is about to execute him 
on the pyre. Ch. Pelling (April 2006), “Educating Crœsus—Talking and Learning in 
Herodotus’ Lydian Logos”. Classical Antiquity 1: 141–177. 168 Alon Segev
originally posed by Crœsus transpires as a question about two sorts of 
objective fortune—one permanent (ολβος) and the other transient (ευτυχιη), 
but not about the subjective happiness or the individual disposition of being 
happy.4 Alternatively, we can suggest another context in which the question 
can be applied to happiness as well, but then we distance too much from the 
original text. My aim is to avoid conflating the terms of happiness and luck 
and instead to illuminate what could be the true intent of the question posed 
by Crœsus, and how it can be understood in a modern context. 
In order to detail my proposition, I will start with a critical discussion 
of Solon’s response to Crœsus’ question. Then, I will move to a critical 
discussion of Aristotle’s interpretation of this conversation between Solon 
and Crœsus, concluding with my own interpretation and reading of Solon’s 
answer. 
There are two methodological difficulties that I encountered in treating 
this subject. There is, first of all, the question about the Greek origin of the 
text and how meaning is dependent on the original text and its subsequent 
translations. For this purpose, I rely on philological studies of the text. 
Contrary to the Continental trend that started with Heidegger and was 
continued in Gadamer, Derrida and Agamben, for example, I do not think 
that hyperbolized etymological efforts lead to an ameliorated understanding 
of ancient texts for our modern times. 
The second methodological difficulty concerns the unity of “happiness.” 
Are we speaking about one united phenomenon when we say “happiness,” or 
rather are we referring to several phenomena? And if it is several phenomena, 
are they related to each other, and if they are, by what means? A great deal 
of philosophical literature has been dedicated to the question about the 
equivocalness and simultaneous precision of Aristotle’s use of ευδαιμονια 
in the Nicomachean Ethics.5 This difficulty is a serious one, because it 
4 For the purposes of this article, objective means something that is public. Subjective 
means an individual or unshared disposition, such as a headache, happiness, depression, 
etc. 
5 See A. Kenny, “Happiness”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series 
(1965–1966) 66: 93–102; J. L Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”. In: A. Oksenberg 
Rorty (ed.). (1980). Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 15–33; T. H Irwin, “The Metaphysical 
and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics”. In: Rorty (1980), 35–53; J. McDowell, 
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threatens the validity of any potential interpretation.6 I believe, however, 
that it does not undermine the core of my project, which is to shed light on 
both the meaningful and meaningless uses of “happiness” and “bliss,” even 
if its subject be a potentially ambiguous one.7 
Solon
In the first book of his Histories, Herodotus unfolds the story of Crœsus, the 
King of Lydia. Having lead Solon through his palace’s treasuries, Crœsus 
asks Solon who is the happiest man he has ever seen, expecting to hear Solon 
tell him that he himself is the happiest one. Solon, however, turns him down 
in telling him the story of Tellus, who was far less rich than Crœsus. Tellus 
was prosperous in his native state, saw his sons and grandsons doing well, 
and ended his life with a glorious death in the battlefield. In response to 
Crœsus’ subsequent inquiry about “who is the second happiest man,” Solon 
tells the story of two brothers, Cloebis and Biton, who were not as rich as 
Crœsus. They were financially stable and of good health. Both brothers were 
endowed with bodily strength and gained prizes at the games in which they 
participated. Solon continues by explaining that at the feast for Hera, their 
mother had to be brought to the temple by a cart. But because the oxen were 
nowhere to be found, the brothers put themselves under the yoke and carried 
their mother to the temple. The crowds accepted them with extol and honor 
for their devotion. After they sacrificed and feasted in celebration of Hera, 
they went to sleep in the temple and never woke up, dying in their sleep. 
Solon concludes that while living, a man can only be said to be fortunate, 
assuming he has had a prosperous life. Since fortune is as volatile as the 
crops of any given year, one can be said to be blessed or happy only after 
6 This problematic prompted Kant to remove happiness from the scope of morality, 
for happiness is an empirical and hence ambiguous concept, while the idea of morality 
should be conceived a priori. See I. Kant (2008), Grundlagen zur Metaphysik der Sitten. 
Stuttgart: Reclam, 49ff. 
7 Related to this topic is the question of whether any feeling following the satisfaction 
of need, desire, etc. can justly be called happiness. An example of this is the feeling of 
“happiness” that a drug addict feels immediately following the use of his drug of choice. 
As Plato sarcastically describes in Gorgias: “Tell me now whether a man who has an itch 
and scratches it and can scratch to his heart’s content, scratch his whole life long, can 
also live happily” (494d). See N. P. White (2006), A Brief History of Happiness. Malden: 
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his death. Hearing Solon’s response, Crœsus sent him away as worthless, 
since he had not declared the King to be the happiest of all men, referencing 
instead the genuine happiness of men who were not judged according to 
their material wealth.8 
Herodotus continues to explain how Crœsus’ fortune turned over, 
beginning with the loss of his son, Atys, at the hand of his guard, Adrastos.9 
Shortly thereafter the ill-fated Crœsus loses his kingdom to Cyrus, the king 
of Persia and is nearly executed on the pyre.10 He was saved after he told 
Cyrus about the response he once received from Solon.11 Herodotus details 
that these disasters are Gods’ retribution for Crœsus’ ridiculous claims 
that he is the happiest man.12 At the end of the story of Crœsus, Herodotus 
confirms his belief in fate and the mythological gods, straying away from 
a more historical interpretation of the story. 
For the modern reader, the first and main concern that arises from 
Herodotus’ description of Crœsus’ life stems from the accumulative approach 
toward happiness. Solon explains this through a detailed description of man’s 
lifespan: “The limit of life for a man I lay down at seventy years. These 
seventy years give twenty-five thousand and two hundred days.”13 
We can of course measure person’s lifespan by counting the temporal 
units of month, day and minute. However, in determining a person’s quality of 
life, the modern reader would never primarily refer to temporal unity to define 
this person as vicious, happy or extravagant. In order to say, for example, 
that Orson Welles’ career was glamorous one does not need to know how 
many years he has lived. Furthermore, in saying that his career knew ups and 
8 Herodotus (2004), The Histories. Introduction and notes by D. Lateiner. Trans. by 
G. C Macaulay. New York: Barnes & Noble, §§ 29–33. See Pelling (2006: 146–147): 
“In telling Crœsus of Tellus and of Cleobis and Biton (1.30–31), Solon deploys a variety 
of Greek ideals to set against Crœsus’ own estimation of himself: values which center on 
parenthood and children, on a simple sufficiency, on avoiding the disasters which hang 
over any human, on a good death in the service of one’s city (Tellus) or one’s family and 
the gods (Cleobis and Biton), on the desirability of a long and contented life (Tellus) 
or—not quite so good—of an early death (Cleobis and Biton).” 
9 Herodotus (2004), §§ 34–43.
10 Ibid., §§ 46–94. 
11 Ibid., § 86.
12 Ibid., § 34.
13 Ibid., § 32.171 Uncovering the True “Wealth” Of Happiness
downs, one does not necessarily feel obliged to count days, months or years 
in order to determine these fluctuations in his lifespan. The same holds for 
every quality, such as hubris: Crœsus being hubristic cannot be traced back 
to the number of days or years in which he was considered to be arrogant. 
(All the same, we can still say that in his old age he became humble.) 
Similarly, there arises the following question: How many moments 
of good fortune are required to signify happiness at the time of a person’s 
death? That is, how could moments of good fortune accumulate in order to 
indicate happiness? From Herodotus’ text, one gathers that there can never 
be a complete lifespan, as far as happiness is concerned. As Herodotus 
puts it: “And Crœsus paid the debt due for the sin of his fifth ancestor, who 
being one of the spearman of the Heracleidai driven by the treachery of 
a woman, and having slain his master.”14 In other words, fate stretches in 
both directions beyond the lifespan of the individual. To the modern reader, 
the main difficulty lies in the accumulative approach toward happiness. There 
is hence need to enhance Solon’s description of happiness. 
Aristotle
Long before modern scholars and readers were concerning themselves with 
Solon’s response to Crœsus’ question, Aristotle was disquieted by Solon’s 
accumulative approach to happiness and offered his own alternative. His 
is only a partial alternative, for in his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle supports 
Solon’s accumulative approach.15 In the Nicomachean Ethics, on the other 
hand, Aristotle only partly endorses Solon’s accumulative approach as he 
brings forward his alternative reading of Solon’s description of happiness, 
which criticizes Solon’s beliefs. Let us begin with his alternative and then 
see how he wants to integrate Solon’s accumulative approach into this 
present argument. 
For Solon, happiness depends on external factors and their constancy 
during one’s lifespan. External factors immediately yield an impression of 
fragility, as the individual himself is not in control of the forces that can 
potentially affect his happiness. Aristotle, conversely, wants to disconnect 
the concept of happiness as much as possible from external factors, making 
14 Ibid., § 91.
15 Aristotle (1973), Ethics. Trans. with introduction J. L Ackrill. London: Farber, 198.172 Alon Segev
it immune to the shifts of fate and independent of the external factors of 
wealth, honor and fame.16 Happiness is willed for its sake, Aristotle claims, 
and not for the sake of something else. Thus, it is defined as a condition of 
self-sufficiency.17 Aristotle explains: “Happiness, then, is something final 
and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.”18 Human essence, or reason, 
is the most independent of and the least threatened by external changes.19 
Now, in the case that happiness does not consist in contemplative 
solitude alone—as Aristotle sometimes implies20—then reason or state of 
mind alone is not enough to distinguish between the happy and unhappy 
man.21 The most independent and thus stable action turns out to be virtue, 
for virtue is supposed to be done for its own sake, and not for the sake of 
something else: “For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous 
activities.”22 Hence, “happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with 
perfect virtue.”23 
And yet, being virtuous also implies the external factors of resources, 
friends, abilities, good physical condition, social surrounding, etc.; in 
one word—good fortune. This is the quantitative facet in Aristotle’s 
teaching: “… the happy man can never become miserable—though he 
will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.”24 
By shifting the emphasis from fate and the quantity of moments of 
good-fortune to virtue and character, Aristotle succeeds in finding a much 
16 See Aristotle (1969), Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. and introduced by D. Ross. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 11f. For this matter see T. H Irwin. “Permanent Happiness—
Aristotle and Solon”. In: N. Sherman (ed.) (1999), Aristotle’s Ethics—Critical 
Essays. USA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1–33.
17 Aristotle (1973), 12.
18 Ibid. From here stems the ambiguity of Aristotle’s concept of happiness, that is, 
whether it is something completely spiritual—as book 10 and parts of book 1 of the NE 
as well as the EE suggest—and can therefore be completely independent, or whether it is 
rather a matter of virtue and practical attitude, implying its dependency on and reference 
to material reality and other people. 
19 Aristotle (1973), 12ff. 
20 See footnote 18.
21 Aristotle (1973), 16.
22 Ibid., 20. 
23 Ibid., 24.
24 Ibid., 21.173 Uncovering the True “Wealth” Of Happiness
more appropriate and meaningful way to relate to happiness as an example 
of quality rather than quantity. “Happiness” is no longer a product of the sum 
of moments of good fortune. It is rather a matter of meaning, a core around 
which one’s whole life is arranged.25 Aristotle explains that even in hard times 
and struggles with life’s misfortunes, “nobility shines through, when a man 
bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through insensibility 
to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.”26 The happiness of the 
good man, Aristotle believes, is not made up of “x” fortunate moments 
in his lifespan, but rather of his character and deeds. Aristotle offers the 
following explanation: 
If activities are, as we said, what determines the character of life, no 
blessed man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that 
are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, 
bears all the chances of life becomingly and always makes the best of 
circumstances.27 
Character and meaning cannot be quantitatively measured, as Aristotle shows 
in NE book 10, chapter 4. He concludes with the following, explaining how 
happiness cannot be measured as one would measure time: 
… of pleasure the form is complete at any and every time. Considered in 
simple terms, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, 
and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. 
This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible 
to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be pleased; for that 
which takes place in a moment is a whole.28 
Here Solon’s accumulative approach proves to be completely meaningless, 
for happiness and pleasure cannot be measured. 
Statements of quality such as “I am pleased” or “I am happy” cannot 
be quantitatively measured, as Aristotle correctly claims, for they are 
experienced meaningfully and not as a sum of attributes. We must still 
explore whether it makes any sense at all to evoke a third person’s external 
25 For this matter see Th. Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”. In: Rorty (1980), 7–14.
26 Aristotle (1969), 21.
27 Ibid., 21.
28 Ibid., 255 (emphasis mine).174 Alon Segev
perspecftive in order to determine one’s personal condition. “To be pleased” 
looks grammatically similar like “to be pained” or “I have a headache,” in 
that they all refer to one’s subjective disposition and not to something that 
can be objectively and publically assessed. I do not learn about my headache, 
its intensity or its location from somebody else, and neither do I infer it. 
“I have terrible headache in the left side of my head” means that I am in this 
condition, I am conditioned by it, I am immersed in it. Could it then make 
any sense to ask somebody whether I have headache? 
As we have just seen, Aristotle claims that pleasure is not something 
that takes place within a span of time that is measured quantitatively. Would 
it then make sense to claim that the feeling of happiness arrives one second 
after I am told by, for example, a new age priest that I am the happiest man 
in the world, or would it be more plausible that he would gradually convince 
me that I am happier now than I was two weeks ago? 
Critical discussion 
We have just seen that Crœsus’ question apparently turns out to be 
meaningless; happiness and pleasure are not objective data that we infer 
from or learn about from a third party, but they are rather subjective 
dispositions. I will now demonstrate to what extent this question can be 
considered in a wholly logical way. Each one of the following alternatives 
reformulates the question about happiness and affects the basic presumption 
of Solon and Aristotle, thus illuminating a new and unique way to present 
Solon’s initial response to the question posed by Crœsus to the modern reader. 
Solon and Aristotle agree on three things:
1. They have no contention with Crœsus’ question; they do not find 
it meaningless and instead are willing to treat it as a valid starting 
point for a discussion on the meaning of happiness. 
2. Aristotle (in the EE and partly in the NE) and Solon agree that luck 
can be measured or counted.
3. They both share the same contradicting perspectives on life. On the 
one hand, they consider life to be a whole and complete process; 
i.e. it begins with one’s birth and ends with his death. On the other 
hand, we have seen Solon claim that Crœsus pays for the sin of his 
fifth ancestor. Similarly, Aristotle claims: “It would be odd, then, 
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time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be odd if the 
fortunes of the descendants did not for some time have some effect 
on the happiness of their ancestors.”29 
Herodotus’ Solon and Aristotle disagree, however, about the nature of 
happiness. Solon argues that happiness consists of an “x” number of fortunate 
events and zero unfortunate events during the whole lifespan. On the contrary, 
Aristotle claims in the NE that happiness is a matter of character which 
persists continuously throughout hard and misfortunate times, although it 
is not entirely indifferent to them, as we have seen. 
As this article has already suggested, there is normally no purpose 
in asking somebody else about the state of my own happiness, for it is not 
a matter we learn of or infer from what somebody else tells us, from external 
perspective, but rather a condition in which a person finds himself, similar 
to the physical ailment of a headache or that of depression. There exists, on 
the other hand, the need to inquire about one’s luck or good fortune, such as 
if he has just been the recipient of the free trip giveaway that his employer 
was offering, for example. I can, in other words, collect information about 
events that have meaning for me. 
And yet, when we inquire about happiness in a different context, the 
question receives a completely separate meaning. We can ask, for example, 
whether the American people were happy under President Bush Jr., happier 
under President Bush Sr., and happiest under President Clinton. This 
formulation obliterates the distinction between luck and happiness. We are 
no longer considering the state of happiness as it relates to the entire lifespan 
of the individual, but rather submitting it to the fluctuating and endless 
change of luck. The same question about the level of satisfaction among 
Americans according to these three presidents could be posed again in the 
next millennium, and furthermore it could be referred to an infinite number 
of American presidents and citizens. Now, it is very unlikely, but if this is 
what Solon implies when referencing the three dead happy people (Tellus, 
Cloebis and Biton), then their “happiness” can still change along with the 
context in which they will be considered. This does not seem, however, to 
be the case based on the limitations that Solon puts on his consideration of 
the state of happiness, for he states that the person can be conclusively called 
29 Ibid., 20. Glorious and peaceful deaths are indispensible for what would be dubbed 
in the ancient times as a “happy life.” See Asheri et al. (2007), 97–98. 176 Alon Segev
“happy” only after he has terminated. Thus, he must have been forced to 
abandon the question of happiness as a futile and meaningless effort. 
Ultimately, the problem is not with the answer, as Aristotle contends, 
but rather with the question itself. By working out this question as we have 
done in this article, we realize that we can treat Crœsus’ original question in 
two ways: We can either pose it in such a way that the distinction between 
luck and happiness is lost (i.e., both become subjected to fluctuating and 
endless changes of differing contexts and perspectives), or alternatively, 
we can declare Crœsus’ question meaningless while still maintaining the 
distinction between happiness and luck. That is to say, happiness in the 
principal sense—as a kind of psychical or psycho-physical condition akin 
to being in the condition of depression, headache, etc.—cannot be learnt 
or inferred by asking a third party about it, as Crœsus does in posing his 
question to Solon. Thus, Crœsus’ inquiry cannot refer to the principal 
sense of “happiness.” On the other hand, in its secondary sense, happiness 
can be inquired after, as for example when we ask about the “happiness” 
of the American people under certain presidents. As Asheri demonstrates, 
Herodotus’ Solon talks here about permanent and transient happiness (ολβος 
and ευτυχιη).30 This means that the question about the subjective disposition 
of happiness does not occur here at all. If Asheri is correct, we are still 
left, however, with the problem of “happiness” being interpreted as either 
transient or permanent. That is, how could somebody ever be called happy if 
the context and perspectives are always changing? Happiness as a subjective 
disposition can serve as a solution to this paradox. But if happiness is more 
understood in terms of reputation, namely, the way a person appears through 
the eyes of others, it seems that this aforementioned paradox is unavoidable. 
30 Asheri et al. (2007), 97–98. 